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Abstract 
One important critique of multiculturalism is that it promotes “essentialism”, reifying the identities 
and practices of minority groups. In Anne Phillips’ words, multiculturalism “exaggerates the internal 
unity of cultures, solidifies differences that are currently more fluid, and makes people from other 
cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are”. Multiculturalism has therefore become a 
“cultural straitjacket” rather than a “cultural liberator”, and requires “radical overhaul” if it is to serve 
emancipatory goals. In this paper I challenge this claim. The phenomenon of essentialism surely 
exists, but is multiculturalism really to blame? I argue that the essentialist critique conflates different 
issues, jumping from critiques of academic theories of multiculturalism to critiques of government 
policies to critiques of everyday street-level discourses of ethnic difference. Once we distinguish these 
different targets, the essentialist critique is less damning to multiculturalism than initially supposed. 
Indeed, we may find that the theories and practices of liberal multiculturalism, far from being the 
cause of the problem of essentialism, are a remedy to them. 
Keywords 
Multiculturalism; ethnic identities; essentialism; citizenship. 
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Since the late 1960s, in response to increasing restiveness and mobilization on the part of minority 
groups, a number of Western democracies have engaged in new experiments in the recognition and 
accommodation of ethnic diversity. These experiments include: 
 recognizing land rights and self-government rights for indigenous peoples; 
 strengthening regional autonomy and official language status for substate national groups; 
 adopting more accommodationist policies for immigrant groups.
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I will describe all of these as experiments in ‘liberal multiculturalism’.  
While these experiments started to emerge 40 years ago, it took a while for political theorists to turn 
their attention to these developments. It was only in the early 1990s, twenty years later, that we started 
to get the first scholarly discussions by academic political philosophers aiming to articulate normative 
theories of multiculturalism, and to explore how these emerging practices relate to liberal-democratic 
values and principles.  
Both the policies and the theories have come under sustained attack in recent years, and 
multiculturalism is widely viewed as in retreat across the Western democracies. To oversimplify, we 
can place the critics into two broad camps: the “anti-multiculturalists” and the “post-
multiculturalists”.2 Anti-multiculturalists, such as Brian Barry (2001) and Samuel Huntington (2004), 
say that multiculturalist ideas are inherently illiberal – ie., that multiculturalism is based on a 
repudiation of Enlightenment values of individual freedom, democratic citizenship and universal 
human rights, and it is precisely this repudiation of core Enlightenment principles which explains why 
multiculturalists seek to challenge traditional Western models of national citizenship in the name of 
cultural difference. The post-multiculturalists, by contrast, accept that multiculturalism is rooted in 
familiar liberal-democratic ideals of equality, freedom and citizenship, and indeed aims precisely to 
address the many ways in which full equality and citizenship are denied to minorities. They worry, 
however, that multiculturalist reforms have either failed to solve the problems for which it was 
intended or inadvertently created new ones. In Anne Phillips’ words, despite its noble intentions, 
multiculturalism has become a “cultural straitjacket” rather than a “cultural liberator”, and it requires 
“radical overhaul” if it is to serve its original emancipatory goals (Phillips 2007: 16). 
In this chapter, I will focus on the post-multiculturalist critique. I have argued elsewhere that the 
anti-multiculturalists are demonstrably mistaken about the origins and motivations of the rise of 
multiculturalism in the past four decades. The rise of multiculturalism in the West, far from 
repudiating liberal-democratic values, has been part and parcel of a broader rights revolution that is 
intimately linked to processes of liberalization and democratization (Kymlicka 2007). But the post-
multiculturalist critique cannot be so easily dismissed. After all, it is not uncommon for public policies 
to have unintended, even counterproductive, effects, and there’s no reason to assume that 
multiculturalism is immune to this risk. Moreover, despite forty years of experiments in liberal 
multiculturalism it is clear that minorities continue to face many forms of exclusion and 
stigmatization, some of which may indeed be getting worse. So we need to take seriously the 
possibility that multiculturalism has become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution, and 
that it needs overhauling.  
I am particularly interested in the role that academic political theories of multiculturalism are said 
to play in the post-multiculturalist literature. As we will see, post-multiculturalists do not typically say 
that multiculturalism is “good in theory but bad in practice”. On the contrary, they often insist that the 
flaws of multiculturalism in practice are reflected in, and perhaps even attributable to, flaws in the way 
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political theorists have conceptualized multiculturalism. A few even suggest that multiculturalism has 
been better in practice than in theory, and that the situation would have been even worse if academic 
theories of multiculturalism had been implemented more faithfully.  
So political theories of multiculturalism have served as an important target in the post-
multiculturalism literature. The theories are said to be defective, and these theoretical defects are said 
to be at least partly responsible for the failings of multiculturalism in practice. I want to challenge this 
picture. My concern is not primarily to defend theories of multiculturalism, although I do think they 
have often been misinterpreted. My concern, rather, is with the cavalier way post-multiculturalists link 
theory and practice. I will argue that much of the post-multiculturalist critique conflates different 
potential targets, jumping from critiques of academic theories of liberal multiculturalism to critiques of 
government policies of multiculturalism to critiques of everyday street-level discourses or enactments 
of ethnic difference. I will argue that we need to more carefully distinguish these different targets, and 
that once we do, we will find that the criticisms are less damning to liberal multiculturalism than 
initially supposed. Indeed, we may find that the theories and practices of liberal multiculturalism, far 
from being the cause of the problem, are still the best remedy to them. But in any event, we can’t 
make progress on this issue without being more cautious and reflective about the relationship between 
theories and practices. 
To develop this point, I will focus on the issue of “essentialism”, which is one of the most 
important themes in the post-multiculturalist literature. According to critics, liberal multiculturalism 
involves essentializing the identities and practices of minority groups. To quote Phillips, 
multiculturalism  
exaggerates the internal unity of cultures, solidifies differences that are currently more fluid, and 
makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are. 
Multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket, forcing those 
described as members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity, denying them the 
chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine themselves. 
(Phillips 2007: 14) 
This is a widespread concern amongst the post-multiculturalists – I will cite several similar statements 
from Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser and Samuel Scheffler below - even amongst 
those (like Phillips herself) who have earlier expressed sympathy for multiculturalism.  
In one sense, this charge is puzzling. After all, one of the central planks in many defences of 
multiculturalism is precisely the complaint that national identities have all too often been essentialized 
in ways that exclude minorities. Opening up space for multiculturalism has typically required 
challenging these essentialist conceptions of nationhood. We can see this clearly in Parekh’s work on 
nationalism and national identity, where a defense of multiculturalism has been predicated upon a 
critique of essentialism (eg., Parekh 1995, 1998). It seems implausible that multiculturalist theorists 
would begin by attacking essentialist conceptions of national identity and culture and then turn around 
and adopt essentialist conceptions of minority identity and culture.  
But that is indeed what critics argue, and we cannot simply dismiss the objection. No one can 
seriously doubt that the problem of essentialization exists, or that members of minority groups often 
feel they are confined by cultural straitjackets. What it is less clear, I will argue, is the role that 
multiculturalism plays in this phenomenon. When critics blame multiculturalism for causing or 
exacerbating essentialism, they typically conflate political theories, government policies and social 
practices in a way that makes it difficult to diagnose the real source of the problem, and impossible to 
identify appropriate remedies. Or so I will argue. 
I will start by explaining what I mean by liberal multiculturalism, and how it operates in both 
theory and practice. I will then consider the essentialist critique, and explore how it relates theory and 
practice, before concluding with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for ongoing 
debates.  
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1. Liberal Multiculturalism: An Overview 
Much of my work over the past twenty years has been motivated by the hope and belief that there is 
such a thing as a distinctly liberal multiculturalism (hereafter LMC). So I should start by clarifying 
what I mean by `liberal multiculturalism’, and the different senses in which I think it is worth 
defending.  
Both halves of that compound term are important. On the one hand, LMC is a distinctly liberal-
democratic form of multiculturalism, grounded in core liberal values of freedom, equality and 
democracy, and to be evaluated for its effects on these values. It therefore differs from non-liberal or 
illiberal forms of multiculturalism, of which there are many historic examples, in which groups agree 
to terms of peaceful co-existence while remaining indifferent to the freedoms or democratic rights of 
individuals.  
On the other hand, LMC is a distinctly multicultural form of liberal democracy, going beyond the 
familiar list of basic liberties contained in all liberal-democratic theories and constitutions to also 
include policies that recognize and accommodate ethnocultural minorities. Many features of a liberal 
democracy provide important protections to ethnocultural minorities – particularly guarantees of non-
discrimination and guarantees of individual civil liberties (freedom of speech, association, religion 
etc). But a multicultural liberalism differs from other forms of liberal democracy by going beyond 
these generic guarantees to also adopt group-differentiated laws and policies that recognize and 
accommodate various types of diversity, including the three patterns I mentioned earlier: (i) 
indigenous land rights and self-government; (ii) regional autonomy and official language rights for 
national minorities; and (iii) accommodation rights for immigrant groups.
3
 
I have tried to defend LMC at three different levels:  
Philosophical: I believe that if we start from the core premises of liberal political philosophy, as 
articulated by say Mill or Rawls, including their accounts of autonomy and justice, we can show that 
there is no logical or conceptual inconsistency in also endorsing various multicultural laws and 
policies. Indeed, we can construct arguments in which LMC enhances, strengthens or deepens these 
liberal premises – eg., it enhances the ability of individuals to exercise Rawls’s `two moral powers’, 
by securing one or more of the conditions needed for personal and political autonomy; and/or 
enhances society’s compliance with Rawls’ difference principle, by diminishing one or more forms of 
arbitrary disadvantage in life-chances. In particular, I have suggested that a liberal concern for 
autonomy requires a concern for people’s cultural “context of choice”, and that this can generate a 
liberal argument for the adoption of minority rights that enable substate national groups to sustain their 
“societal cultures”, and that enable immigrant groups to have their identities fairly accommodated 
(Kymlicka 1995).
4
 
Policy Goal: This philosophical argument, if valid, shows that LMC is a theoretical possibility – 
ie., one could imagine a hypothetical ideal world containing a version of multiculturalism that fits 
comfortably with liberal-democratic values. Some people might accept that, but insist that this has no 
connection to the actually-existing forms of multiculturalism, which are grounded in different sorts of 
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values that conflict with liberal-democracy. Real-world multiculturalism, on this view, is grounded in 
decidedly illiberal views, and indeed is best understood as being inherently “anti-universalistic in their 
thrust” (Barry 2001: 5), “in its essence anti-European” (Huntington 2004: 171) or even a “war against 
the West” (Kristol 1991: 15). 
I have argued, however, that LMC is not just a theoretical possibility. Rather, it exists as a real-
world practice. Indeed, most of the real-world experiments in recognition and accommodation adopted 
in the Western democracies over the past 40 years have been inspired by a belief that they contribute 
to processes of liberalization and democratization.
5
 These policies have been framed to fit with liberal-
democratic values, and their principles have been interpreted (eg., by bureaucrats and courts) to 
preserve that fit.  
More specifically, multiculturalism can be seen as part of a larger “human rights revolution” in 
relation to ethnic and racial diversity. Prior to World War II, ethnocultural and religious diversity in 
the West was characterized by a range of illiberal and undemocratic relations – including relations of 
conqueror and conquered; colonizer and colonized; master and slave; settler and indigenous; racialized 
and unmarked; normalized and deviant; orthodox and heretic; civilized and primitive; ally and enemy. 
These relationships of hierarchy were justified by racialist ideologies that explicitly propounded the 
superiority of some peoples and cultures, and their right to rule over others. These ideologies were 
widely accepted throughout the Western world, and underpinned both domestic laws (eg., racially-
biased immigration and citizenship policies) and foreign policies (eg., in relation to overseas colonies). 
After WWII, however, the world recoiled against Hitler’s fanatical and murderous use of such 
ideologies, and the UN decisively repudiated them in favour of a new ideology of the equality of races 
and peoples. And this new assumption of human equality has generated a series of political 
movements designed to contest the lingering presence or enduring effects of older hierarchies. We can 
distinguish three “waves” of such movements: (a) the struggle for decolonization, concentrated in the 
period 1948 to 1965; (b) the struggle against racial segregation and discrimination, initiated and 
exemplified by the African-American civil rights movement from 1955 to 1965; and (c) the struggle 
for multiculturalism and minority rights, which has emerged from the late 1960s. 
Each of these movements draws upon the human rights revolution, and its foundational ideology of 
the equality of races and peoples, to challenge the legacies of earlier ethnic and racial hierarchies. 
Indeed, the human rights revolution plays a double role here: not just as the inspiration for struggle, 
but also as a constraint on the permissible goals and means of that struggle. Insofar as historically 
excluded groups struggle against earlier hierarchies in the name of equality, they too have to renounce 
their own traditions of exclusion or oppression in the treatment of women, gays, people of mixed race, 
religious dissenters, and so on. The framework of human rights, and of liberal-democratic 
constitutionalism more generally, provides the overarching framework within which these struggles 
are addressed. We cannot understand the rise of LMC in the West – we cannot understand when, 
where and why these experiments arose, or how they have been formulated - except as part of this 
larger human rights revolution (Kymlicka 2007). 
Outcomes: One could accept this claim about the liberal inspiration for multicultural experiments, 
and yet still think that they have failed in practice. Policies often have perverse effects, and so LMC 
may have operated in practice to reduce autonomy, limit democratic participation, and/or exacerbate 
inequalities. As Koopmans puts it, while there are “legitimate normative reasons” for multiculturalism, 
“we cannot simply assume that what is normatively justifiable will also be practically efficient” 
(Koopmans 2006: 5), and indeed he argues that it has been counter-productive.  
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Yet here again I want to argue that LMC has often worked to enhance liberal-democratic values. 
The evidence on outcomes is not easy to locate: very few multiculturalism policies have been 
systematically studied. As Reitz puts it, while academic discussions of multiculturalism have been 
extensive, “there is no real evaluation. The information base for such an evaluation is simply not 
there” (Reitz 2009: 13). 
So any conclusions in this field will need to be tentative. Yet insofar as we have preliminary 
evidence, it suggests that most real-world experiments in liberal multiculturalism within the Western 
democracies have had beneficial effects on liberal values. Let me briefly review the three main cases:  
 Substate national groups: the evidence is perhaps clearest in relation to substate national groups, 
where the shift to regional autonomy and (where relevant) official language status has enhanced 
the economic, political and social equality of national minorities, and done so in ways that fully 
protect individual civil and political rights. Indeed, in many cases, these substate national 
societies have used their autonomy to adopt more liberal policies than in the larger society. So 
this particular form of liberal multiculturalism is broadly uncontested in the scholarly literature: 
it is difficult to find anyone who thinks, for example, that it was a mistake for Spain to federalize 
to accommodate Catalan and Basque nationalism, or that Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, 
Finland or the UK should revoke their existing systems of autonomy or bilingualism.  
 Indigenous peoples: the evidence regarding indigenous peoples is less clear, since they continue 
to be the most disadvantaged members of society, and so the adoption of liberal multiculturalist 
models has clearly not been “successful” in the usual sense of that term. Yet if we compare 
indigenous peoples across the Western democracies, or indeed within individual countries, those 
with stronger self-government rights are doing better than those without. And here again there is 
a broad consensus in support of this approach amongst scholars and international organizations, 
reflected in the virtually unanimous adoption of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in 2007.
6
 
 Immigrant groups: The most contested case concerns immigrant groups, where there is both 
greater political contestation and scholarly disagreement about the effects of multiculturalism 
policies. While many scholars celebrate the benefits of multiculturalism in this or that country, 
an equal number of scholars have declared it to be a failure. For example, in an influential recent 
book, Paul Sniderman and Luuk Hagendoorn (2007) blame multiculturalism for the high levels 
of ethnic stereotyping between native Dutch and Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. But of 
course ethnic stereotyping is a pervasive problem throughout history and around the world, 
whether or not multiculturalism policies exist, and they provide no evidence that this 
stereotyping became worse in the Netherlands after the adoption of multiculturalism than before; 
or that it is worse in the Netherlands than in countries that haven’t adopt multiculturalism. In 
short, they make no effort to identify the differential effect that multiculturalism has on pre-
existing dynamics of stereotyping. This is typical of work in the field, which generally lacks 
either longitudinal or comparative data needed to determine the differential effect of adopting 
multiculturalism. However, if we look at those few studies that do have a comparative or 
longitudinal dimension, and hence that attempt to isolate the differential effect of having 
multiculturalism policies, they generally suggest that multiculturalism has been beneficial in 
terms of political participation (Bloemraad 2007; Adams 2007), trust and social capital (Kesler 
and Bloemraad 2010; Harrell 2009; Kazemipur 2009), prejudice (Weldon 2006), solidarity 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Crepaz 2006), and psychological well-being (Berry et al 2006).
7
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I emphasize again the limits of this evidence: it would be premature to claim that we have conclusive 
evidence of the merits of LMC. But it would be even more premature to claim we have evidence for 
its failure. There is a tendency in some quarters to dismiss LMC as an intellectual fad or fashion. But 
as we’ve seen, there were practices of LMC twenty years before there were academic theorists of 
multiculturalism, and the best explanation for the emergence of these practices across a wide range of 
Western democracies starting in the 1960s is that they were part of a larger human rights revolution 
aimed at addressing the lingering effects of inherited racial and ethnic hierarchies, and thereby 
contributing to processes of liberalization and democratization. And while these hopes may have been 
naïve or misguided, there is no evidence I can see that these experiments have generally or 
systematically eroded liberal democratic values. On the contrary, there is some provisional evidence 
for their beneficial effects. 
And yet it is equally obvious that any such benefits are very uneven across different countries and 
different minorities. Western societies remain scarred by ethnic and racial hierarchies, by feelings of 
distrust across ethnic and religious lines, and by anxieties about the future direction of these 
relationships. Even if on average these policies have had beneficial rather than pernicious effects, they 
clearly have not achieved the highest hopes of their defenders, and in at least a few high-profile cases, 
they seem not to have worked at all. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that there are some situations 
where they cannot work. Successful models of LMC have preconditions that are not always present, 
particularly outside the context of consolidated democracies, and efforts by international organizations 
to diffuse models of liberal multiculturalism have had very mixed and uneven results (Kymlicka 
2007).  
A central task is to try to explain the deeply uneven nature of multiculturalism’s effects, to look 
honestly at the failures and limitations, as well as the successes. In this respect, the current wave of 
sober second thoughts about multiculturalism, represented in particular by the growing post-
multiculturalist literature, is welcome and necessary. But as we will see, the usefulness of this post-
multiculturalist critique is compromised by a persistent tendency to conflate different levels of 
analysis, and to move inconsistently between theory and practice. 
2. The Post-Multiculturalist Critique of Essentialism 
According to the post-multiculturalist critique, the emancipatory impulse underlying multiculturalism 
is being subverted by the “essentialist” way that cultures or identities are understood. Let me quote a 
few characteristic examples of this concern: 
 Nancy Fraser: “[By] enjoining the elaboration and display of authentic, self-affirming and self-
generated collective identities, it [the identity model] puts moral pressure on individual members 
to conform to group culture. The result is often to impose a single, drastically simplified group 
identity, which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifications 
and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations (Fraser 2001: 24). 
 Seyla Benhabib: Multiculturalism involves a ‘reductive sociology of culture’ that ‘risks 
essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race, it risks reifying 
cultures as separate entities by overemphasizinng the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms 
that potentially legitimise repressive demands for cultural conformity; and by treating cultures as 
badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put them beyond the reach of 
critical analysis’…. `The culture-based approach `yields illiberal consequences’ including 
`acceptance of the need to `police’ these [group] boundaries to regulate internal membership and 
`authentic’ life forms’ (Benhabib 2002: 4, 68) 
(Contd.)                                                                  
up, it remains an exception to a growing literature showing that multiculturalism policies have positive effects in cross-
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 Jane Cowan: ‘concerned with the ethical ambiguities of a discourse which may constrain, as 
much as enable, many of those it is meant to empower, by forcing their expressions of difference 
into a dichotomous interpretive frame that misrepresents their complex identities’… `This is the 
central ambiguity of a minority rights discourse; that it must deny ambiguity and fix difference 
in the realms of identity, or cultural practice, in defense of distinct cultures…even when meant to 
contest claims of national homogeneity, it locks us ever more tightly into precisely the same 
national logic of purity, authenticity and fixity’ (Cowan 2001: 154, 171) 
 Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘We know that acts of recognition, and the civil apparatus of such 
recognition, can sometimes ossify the identities that are their object (‘if pursued with excessive 
zeal’)… ‘upholding differences among groups may entail imposing uniformity within them… 
Indeed, when multiculturalists like Kymlicka say that there are so many `cultures’ in this or that 
country, what drops out of the picture is that every `culture’ represents not only difference but 
the elimination of difference: the groups represents a clump of relative homogeneity, and that 
homogeneity is perpetuated and enforced by regulative mechanisms designed to marginalize and 
silence dissent from its basic norms and mores’ (Appiah 2005: 110, 151-2) 
 Samuel Scheffler: talk of multiculturalism ‘provides an invitation to mischief both by 
encouraging us to think in sustainable strong-preservationist terms and by promoting a distorted 
and potentially oppressive conception of the relations between individuals and cultures’ 
(Scheffler 2007: 124) 
This is just a sample – one can find virtually identical statements in Patchen Markell, David Hollinger, 
Jurgen Habermas, Wendy Brown, and many others. And the general conclusion, shared by all, is that 
we need a “radical overhaul” of multiculturalism (Phillips 2007: 16). 
What is striking about this list of authors is that it includes many people who have devoted their 
careers to exposing the false universalism or false neutrality underlying traditional republican or 
unitary models of difference-blind citizenship, and who therefore might be expected to be sympathetic 
to multiculturalism. These are not the anti-multiculturalists who are ideologically opposed to any 
particularist corruption of the purity or sanctity of republican citizenship. Nor are they conservatives 
who are nostalgic for the good old days of homogenous nationhood or unreflective patriotism. Rather, 
these are progressive theorists who take seriously the multiculturalist premise that traditional models 
of citizenship have been unjust and exclusionary, who support struggles for the emancipation of 
historically excluded groups, and who are committed to listening to their voices. 
So, unlike anti-multiculturalists, these theorists are not out simply to score points against 
multiculturalism, or to ridicule or caricature it. In many ways their instincts are to sympathize with 
multiculturalist struggles. And yet they have all come to the conclusion that multiculturalism needs a 
radical overhaul, and in particular an overhaul of its essentialist tendencies. 
If so many scholars who are committed to the inclusion and empowerment of minorities have come 
to this conclusion, then it must be true. But in what sense it is true? Or rather, in what contexts it is 
true? For example, when Scheffler says that multiculturalism “encourages” people to think in 
preservationist terms, or that it “promotes” an oppressive relationship between individuals and 
cultures, who or what is doing this encouraging and promoting, in what contexts? Is it philosophical 
theories of multiculturalism that are encouraging essentialism, perhaps because of the way they 
conceptualize culture and identity? Is it official public policies of multiculturalism that are 
encouraging essentialism, perhaps because of the way they define access to rights and entitlements? 
Or is it rather a more diffuse public ethos or discourse of multiculturalism that encourages 
essentialism, perhaps by reinforcing or legitimating pre-existing tendencies towards stereotyping?  
In order to know how to radically overhaul liberal multiculturalism, we need to pin down the 
source of the problem. As it turns out, despite the apparent similarity in their phrasing, these writers 
have different targets in mind. Indeed, they actually give contradictory accounts of where the problem 
lies, in ways that generate different remedies. Once we distinguish these different targets and 
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remedies, what appears to be an overwhelming consensus on LMC’s essentialist flaws starts to 
dissolve into a more disparate and disjointed series of largely unsupported speculations and assertions. 
(a) Critiques of Multiculturalist Theories 
In some cases, the target of the essentialist critique is philosophical theories of liberal 
multiculturalism. I will start with these, before moving to those who focus more on public policies or 
public ethos.  
The two writers are most clearly target philosophical theories of multiculturalism are Benhabib and 
Appiah, who both have extended discussions of the ideas of culture and identity developed either in 
my work or that of Charles Taylor. Indeed the quotes listed above from Appiah and Benhabib follow 
directly on from their discussions of my account of `societal culture’. It is my concept of societal 
culture, Benhabib claims, that “potentially legitimises repressive demands for cultural conformity”, 
that puts cultures “beyond the reach of critical analysis”, and that entails “acceptance of the need to 
`police’ [group] boundaries to regulate internal membership and `authentic’ life forms”. Similarly, 
Appiah argues that my concept of societal culture “may entail imposing uniformity” within groups, 
because “when multiculturalists like Kymlicka say that there are so many `cultures’ in this or that 
country, what drops out of the picture is that every `culture’ represents not only difference but the 
elimination of difference: the group represents a clump of relative homogeneity, and that homogeneity 
is perpetuated and enforced by regulative mechanisms designed to marginalize and silence dissent 
from its basic norms and mores’ (Appiah 2005: 151-2). 
Unsurprisingly, I think these are misinterpretations of my theory, but I don’t want to go into that 
debate here. I do however need to say something about my idea of societal culture, not to defend it, but 
to help us sort out what follows from their critique of it. As they both note, my account of societal 
culture was intended to explain and evaluate the claims of substate national groups like the Quebecois 
to autonomy and official language rights. In my view, the case of Quebecois nationalism clearly 
exemplifies the goals of liberal multiculturalism, and I was looking for a way to make sense of this 
conceptually.  
In the 1960s Quebec went through what is called the Quiet Revolution, which involved a double 
transformation. First, it involved a process of internal liberalization within French-Canadian society, 
particularly in the form of secularization, civil rights, and gender equality. This is one of the most 
dramatic examples of liberalization I know of, resulting in a society that is today the most liberal 
society in North America, more so than the rest of Canada or the United States (Grabb and Curtis 
2010). Second, it involved a process of increasing nationalist mobilization in relation to the rest of 
Canada, fighting for greater minority rights, particularly self-government and language rights. The 
result of this nationalist mobilization has been a significant reduction in inequalities between 
anglophones and francophones in Canada, whether measured in terms of average incomes, 
government employment, or democratic participation.  
Here is a paradigm case of liberal multiculturalism in action, resulting in greater freedom within 
groups, and greater equality between groups. And while we can see this analytically as two separate 
processes, it was seen by the actors involved as two sides of the same process – namely, building a 
more free, democratic and prosperous Quebecois nation. It wasn’t as if there was one group of liberal 
elites fighting for liberalization, and another group of nationalist elites fighting for nationalism. It was 
the same elite involved in both struggles – an elite committed to liberal nationalism.  
How are we to make theoretical sense of such a case? It is not explicable in the terms of traditional 
liberal theory, with its implicit assumptions about unitary and undifferentiated citizenship. We need 
new concepts to explain how minority rights can enhance liberal values. My suggestion was that self-
government and language rights enabled the consolidation and prosperity of a francophone “societal 
culture” in Quebec. This societal culture provides a “context of choice” for its members – that is, it 
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provides the adequate range of options from which individuals are able to rationally and reflectively 
choose, as required by the liberal commitment to autonomy. Of course, this strategy of empowering 
Quebec to protect a francophone societal culture carries risks: these very same rights and powers could 
be used to suppress individual freedom in the name of upholding some vision of an “authentic” or 
“traditional” Quebecois culture. To avoid this risk, we need to understand these rights as “external 
protections” not “internal restrictions”. That is, these rights are intended to diminish the extent to 
which members of a minority are vulnerable to the external decisions of the larger society, and are not 
intended to allow the minority to suppress the basic civil and political freedoms internally. This 
principle is reflected in the requirement that a minority’s powers of self-government are constrained 
by the same constitutional requirement to respect human rights as all other levels of government. Since 
minority rights, on this view, are understood as external protections whose aim is to ensure the 
flourishing of a societal culture as a context of choice, they provide no justification for exemptions 
from or limitations on the basic liberties. Of course, once we rule out internal restrictions, this means 
that individual members will be free to question inherited beliefs and practices, and to adapt, revise or 
even reject them, as indeed happened during Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, with its dramatic collapse of 
traditional (Catholic, patriarchal) ways of life. It is important, therefore, to distinguish the flourishing 
of a societal culture from changes to the “character” of that culture. Minority rights for the Quebecois 
ensured the former, but allowed dramatic change to the latter in response to the exercise of individual 
autonomy. 
That was my way of trying to make theoretical sense of the Quebec case, using a handful of new 
concepts - “societal culture” as a context of choice, external protections vs internal restrictions, and so 
on. As I hope this makes clear, the whole point of the concept of societal culture was that it did not 
provide a justification for imposing “authentic life forms” (Benhabib) or for “marginalizing and 
silencing dissent” (Appiah). It was intended precisely to explain how it was possible for a minority 
society to seek minority rights while disavowing any desire to enforce traditional lifestyles, and 
instead to dramatically liberalize and transform itself through the exercise of individual autonomy.  
So, predictably, I think that Benhabib and Appiah’s interpretations are uncharitable. Both authors 
claim that my use of the term `societal culture’ somehow legitimates denying individuals the right to 
rationally revise their inherited ways of life, but so far as I can tell, they simply assert rather than argue 
for this. However, I’m not a neutral observer in this debate, and others have found their critiques 
compelling. And in any event, that’s not my main interest in this paper. 
So let’s assume they are indeed right, and that my concept of societal culture has these flaws. What 
implications does this have for the real-world practice of liberal multiculturalism? After all, they both 
insist that their anxiety is not just about essentialism within the halls of academic philosophy 
departments. They believe that essentialism is a problem with multiculturalism as a political project, 
which therefore needs a “radical overhaul”. But what would this mean in cases of substate nationalism 
like Quebec? Recall that my concept of societal culture was developed to justify and explain claims 
for official language status and regional autonomy of such groups. Should we radically overhaul the 
way liberal-democratic states deal with such groups? Should we reject their claims to official language 
status and regional autonomy? 
And here, things start to get murky. Benhabib and Appiah fudge their bets. Both immediately deny 
that they are necessarily opposed to the language and autonomy rights accorded to Quebec. As Appiah 
says about Quebec’s language policy, “let me be clear that my target is not the particulars of the 
policy, but its rationale…I’m happy to put myself in the position of the proverbial philosopher who 
demands `that’s all very well in practice, but will it work in theory’?” (Appiah 2005: 123, 101). The 
policy may work “very well in practice”, but he thinks that talk about preserving societal cultures 
misidentifies why it can be a legitimate part of liberal-democratic practice. Similarly, Benhabib says 
that she “welcomes and supports” movements for “intercultural justice”, including many struggles for 
regional autonomy, but she too thinks that they can be legitimate precisely because, and insofar as, 
they are not about preserving cultures (Benhabib 2002: ix, 65). 
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So both accept that this model of real-world liberal multiculturalism – regional autonomy and 
official language rights for substate national minorities – can work well in practice, and may not be in 
need of a radical overhaul, so long as they are not based on “culturalist premises” (Benhabib 2002: 
65). So what, on their view, does provide the legitimating basis for struggles by substate national 
groups for autonomy and language rights?  
In both cases, they respond that the basis for evaluating such movements should be “political” not 
“cultural”. In Benhabib’s words, “intercultural justice between human groups should be defended in 
the name of justice and freedom and not an elusive preservation of cultures”. Struggles for recognition 
and identity/difference should be supported “to the degree to which they are movements for 
democratic inclusion, greater social and political justice, and cultural fluidity. But movements for 
maintaining the purity or distinctiveness of cultures seem to me to be irreconcilable with both 
democratic and more basic epistemological considerations”. In short, movements of minority groups 
can be progressive “to the degree that they are motivated by other than conservationist impulses” 
(Benhabib 2002: ix). And so, in the particular case of Quebec or other movements for autonomy, she 
says: “If asked how to evaluate claim for regional autonomy, `I would say, Study their demands and 
their platform first!’”. For example, we should ask how they propose to treat women, immigrants, 
democracy, foreign policy. And she insists that this `political’ approach is very different from my 
argument which is “based on culturalist premises rather than political evaluations of movements and 
their goals” (Benhabib 2002: 65). 
Similarly, Appiah says Quebec’s language policy can be understood and justified not in terms of 
maintaining a francophone societal culture, but as “equality of citizenship in a francophone state” 
(Appiah 2004: 103). Quebecers have a democratic right to make French “the political language”, and 
once they have done so, it is appropriate to ensure that all citizens have equal access to it. This 
citizenship-based argument, he says, is different from a right to maintain a francophone societal 
culture, since it operates within a framework of equal citizenship and individual autonomy not cultural 
preservation (Appiah 2004: 104).  
I confess I have no idea how to understand this distinction between “political” and “culturalist”. 
The whole point about the Quebec case, as I mentioned earlier, is that these two motivations were 
fused. Elites during the Quiet Revolution wanted to consolidate their societal culture (vis-à-vis the 
larger society) while simultaneously liberalizing and democratizing their society internally, improving 
its treatment of gays, women, immigrants, religious minorities and so on. These were two dimensions 
of the same underlying motivation – namely, to build a prosperous and democratic francophone 
society within Canada. They were committed to liberal-democratic values, but they were not 
indifferent to the scale or unit within which those values were operationalized. They wanted to 
implement those liberal-democratic values within the province of Quebec as an autonomous 
francophone society. And while they were strongly committed to nationalist values, they were not 
indifferent to the form that nationhood took: they wanted a liberal-democratic form of nationalism. 
This is not unique to Quebec. It is a characteristic feature of substate nationalist movements across 
the Western democracies since the 1960s. They are simultaneously and intensely both “political” and 
“cultural”. If it’s to be useful, any normative political theory of (post)-multiculturalism has to say 
something about this combination. And yet, so far as I can tell, both Benhabib and Appiah fail in this 
task. 
Indeed, their positions are full of ambiguities. On one interpretation, Benhabib and Appiah are 
saying that certain political criteria operate as a constraint on culturalist political projects. On this 
interpretation, struggles for minority rights are legitimate so long as human rights norms and 
individual civil rights are respected. Regional autonomies must, for example, comply with 
constitutional protections of individual rights, and with international human rights norms. If so, then of 
course I fully agree, and this simply restates an essential part of any liberal multiculturalist position 
(and of international norms of minority rights).  
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But their comments suggest a more radical interpretation, which is that movements for regional 
autonomy are illegitimate insofar as they have any “culturalist premises” or “conservationist 
impulses”. These movements are illegitimate if ideas of maintaining cultural distinctiveness play any 
role in their motivations. On this view, it’s not enough that minority groups comply with the 
constraints of liberal norms, they must be solely and exclusively motivated by these norms. They 
must, in short, be indifferent to the scale or unit of liberal-democracy, and have no intrinsic preference 
for exercising liberal-democracy in, say, a predominantly francophone Quebec rather than a 
predominantly anglophone Canada.  
If this is their position, then it is truly radical. It would involve rejecting all real-world substate 
nationalist movements, since they clearly are not indifferent to the scale or societal/linguistic context 
within which liberal-democracy operates. It would therefore seem to entail abolishing autonomy for 
Catalonia, Quebec, Flanders, Puerto Rico, South Tyrol, all of which emerged from what, on this view, 
would be illegitimate political movements.  
If this is indeed their view, then I think it is wholly implausible. It would involve rejecting what are 
almost-universally viewed as successful forms of accommodation, and would do so on the basis of a 
fetishistic dislike of `culturalist’ motivations. It is also, I think, deeply hypocritical, since it’s clear that 
majorities also operate on these culturalist motivations, and yet Appiah and Benhabib do not suggest 
that the majority’s claims to self-government and language rights should be rejected. Members of 
dominant groups in England, Spain or Canada are not indifferent to the scale or linguistic context of 
liberal-democratic political life: they want to engage in liberal-democratic politics in contexts where 
they form a majority, and which use their language. Yet Appiah and Benhabib do not suggest that 
these states should lose their independence because of these culturalist premises. No one thinks that 
Denmark or the Czech Republic should give up their independence and join a larger German-speaking 
political unit, on the grounds that their commitment to national independence has “culturalist 
premises”. So why should Catalonia or Quebec give up their pursuit of autonomy on the grounds that 
it involves culturalist premises? 
In fact, both Appiah and Benhabib realize that this radical interpretation is untenable, and so back 
off it. Appiah, for example, says that while Quebec’s language law is only permissible if it is 
motivated by equal citizenship values not cultural survival values, he then acknowledges that these 
two motivations are not really separable. He acknowledges that sustaining a francophone societal 
culture is aided by the choice of French as the “political language” for Quebec, and indeed he accepts 
that this is why that particular language was democratically chosen. Moreover, he says, “such an aim 
is a perfectly acceptable consideration in democratic politics”, so long as it is pursued within a 
framework of equal citizenship and personal autonomy (Appiah 2004: 103-4). But now we’re back to 
the more modest position that liberal-democratic norms constrain the pursuit of culturalist projects – a 
position that simply restates the liberal multiculturalism he claimed to be criticizing. 
Similarly, Benhabib says that being motivated by cultural allegiances is after all perfectly 
legitimate, so long as “the goal of a public policy for the preservation of cultures must be the 
empowerment of the members of cultural groups to appropriate, enrich, and even subvert the terms of 
their own cultures as they may decide” (Benhabib 2002: 66-67). In short, culturalist projects are 
legitimate so long as they do not impose internal restrictions. But here again, this is simply a 
restatement of the liberal multiculturalism she claims to be critiquing. Benhabib claims that her 
account of “complex cultural dialogue” differs from mine in that it allows “democratic dissent, debate, 
contestation and challenge to be at the centre of practices through which cultures are appropriated”. 
But any liberal conception of multiculturalism, including mine, affirms rights of democratic 
contestation and individual rational revisability. So far as I can tell, neither Benhabib nor Appiah 
provide any conceptual tools or political recommendations that go beyond what is already built into 
the theory and practice of liberal multiculturalism.  
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In any event, this is one version of the post-multiculturalist critique. It starts with the claim that 
academic theories of liberal multiculturalism contain essentialist premises, and while it is implied that 
these flaws have implications for real-world political practices, these implications are left 
indeterminate or ambiguous. Interpreted radically as rejecting any political claims that are even partly 
motivated by culturalist aspirations, it would require rejecting all real-world experiments in liberal 
multiculturalism, regardless of the evidence of their benefits from a liberal-democratic point of view. 
Interpreted more moderately as simply requiring that liberal-democratic constitutional norms be 
respected, it leaves all real-world practices of liberal multiculturalism untouched. Neither 
interpretation, it seems to me, adds to our understanding of the uneven successes and failures of liberal 
multiculturalism. 
(b) Critiques of Multiculturalist Policies 
Let me turn now to a second version of the post-multiculturalist critique, exemplified by Phillips’ 
work.
8
 Recall her central claim that multiculturalism  
exaggerates the internal unity of cultures, solidifies differences that are currently more fluid, and 
makes people from other cultures seem more exotic and distinct than they really are. 
Multiculturalism then appears not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket, forcing those 
described as members of a minority cultural group into a regime of authenticity, denying them the 
chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine themselves 
(Phillips 2007: 14) 
While this sounds similar to Benhabib and Appiah, she explicitly states that her target is not academic 
theories of liberal multiculturalism. Indeed, she says “it would be absurd” to blame theorists for these 
essentializing effects (23). She acknowledges that theorists of multiculturalism often have relatively 
sophisticated understandings of cultural activities and identifications, and it would be a case of 
“mistaken identity” (76) or even “polemical diatribe” (73 ) to accuse theorists of embracing these 
crude notions.  
Her concern, rather, is with the practice of multiculturalism, and with the more simplified 
understandings of culture and identity that inform laws, policies and public discourses. For example, 
she says that “one of the biggest problems” with multiculturalism is “the selective way culture is 
employed to explain behaviour in non-Western societies or individuals from racialised minority 
groups, and the implied contrast with rational, autonomous (Western) individuals, whose actions are 
presumed to reflect moral judgements” (Phillips 2007: 9). Yet as she notes, this is not a problem with 
academic theories of liberal multiculturalism. They do not distinguish (non-Western) “culture” from 
(Western) “reason/judgement”, but rather attempt to show how liberal autonomy itself has cultural 
preconditions. This problem of selectivity, then, arises at a different level, in the way multiculturalist 
ideas get translated into political practices.  
So if Appiah says “that’s all very well in practice, but will it work in theory?”, Phillips’ approach 
could be phrased as “that may work in theory, but will it work in practice?”. This is a different target, 
and it requires different sorts of evidence, and also leads to different conclusions about the sort of 
“radical overhaul” that might be required. 
So what does Phillips mean by the practice of liberal multiculturalism, and how do we judge 
whether it is having these essentializing effects, and how would we fix the problem? At first glance, it 
seems that her concern is with formal laws and policies. The book is essentially a review of a series of 
British cases in which public officials have had to deal with issues of immigrant diversity, including 
forced marriages, the cultural defense, dress-code exemptions, and so on. And so when she says that 
                                                     
8
 Unlike most of the other authors being discussed, Phillips does not suggest abandoning the term `multiculturalism’, and 
does not describe herself as a `post`-multiculturalist. However, as her book title Multiculturalism without Culture 
indicates, she seeks a post-culturalist multiculturalism, and this is relevantly similar to the other authors.  
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multiculturalism “appears as a cultural straitjacket …forcing those described as members of a minority 
cultural group into a regime of authenticity”, it seems to be public officials, acting upon 
multiculturalist laws and policies, who are doing this exaggerating, forcing and denying. 
And yet, as her book proceeds, it becomes clear that this is not in fact her target. On the contrary, 
she repeatedly observes that British public officials – whether educators, social service workers, police 
and judges – often have a fairly sophisticated understanding of the issues. For example, the courts 
have rejected the view of culture as a straitjacket (Phillips 2007: 112), and have dealt sensitively with 
the complexity of rights of exit (Phillips 2007: 144). This sensitivity is due in part to the fact that 
public officials typically receive training in handling these issues – training that is itself part and parcel 
of multiculturalism policies, and that explicitly disavows and warns against simplistic and 
essentializing ideas of culture. 
And so, by the end of the book, her overall conclusion seems to be that the formal laws and 
bureaucratic regulations and procedures are more or less appropriate, and are not themselves in need 
of a radical overhaul. She says that on these basic policy questions “I reach much the same policy 
conclusions” as liberal multiculturalists (Phillips 2007: 113), and it’s not clear in what ways, if any, 
she would change the current laws, regulations, jurisprudence, handbooks, codes of conduct etc that 
are used by public officials to address issues of multiculturalism. 
So what then is the problem of essentialism, on her view? If the problem doesn’t lie with academic 
theories of multiculturalism or with public policies, who or what is encouraging essentialism? If we 
dig deeper, it seems to me that her concern is with a more diffuse phenomenon, which she sometimes 
calls a “public discourse” or “public ethos” of multiculturalism. For example, she says that even if no 
formal law endorses or fosters an essentialist view, “a strongly multicultural public ethos is likely to 
have some of the suggested effects” (76). A multiculturalist “public discourse” or “public ethos”, she 
fears, is likely to reproduce pre-existing stereotypes and prejudices, such as the assumption that non-
Europeans act blindly from cultural compulsion whereas whites act from reason and moral judgement.  
In short, the problem seems to be with the “the way we talk” about multiculturalism in public life, 
and it is this that needs a radical overhaul, not multiculturalist policies per se or academic 
multiculturalist theories. Her concern seems to be with the way multiculturalism is talked about in the 
media, in the associational life of civil society, or even amongst friends and families. 
This is an interesting claim, but it requires unpacking. What exactly is a public ethos of 
multiculturalism, and how do we test whether or not it is having essentializing effects? Her book 
contains many examples of everyday public discourse which exhibits essentializing assumptions – a 
phenomenon well-captured in Gerd Baumann’s famous study of street-level discourses on ethnic 
difference in Southall (Baumann 1996). But as Tariq Modood notes, it may be a mistake to read too 
much into these statements: 
a successful politics of difference-recognition may (or may not) be accompanied by crude, 
confused unreflective notions of culture, but for theorists to latch on to the reification in the 
confused or crude accounts that agents give of their activities and beliefs is actually to over-
homogenize and essentialize the beliefs that people have…The charge of essentialism is itself 
essentialist. It rightly identifies some elements of essentialism in the political discourses of identity 
and culture but attributes a false importance to them. It gives them the status of being THE beliefs 
that constitute the understanding of culture, identity and so on in multiculturalism, when in fact 
multiculturalist discourses may be, indeed invariably are, based on a variety of beliefs and 
assertions about culture. (Modood 2007: 97-8) 
So there are interesting complexities here about how to describe or measure the extent to which a 
‘public ethos’ does or does not perpetuate essentialist assumptions.  
However, for my purposes, the more pressing question is how we would we go about fixing the 
problem of an essentializing public ethos. Some commentators might think that the best way to change 
this public ethos is to reject formal policies of multiculturalism. But that is not Phillips’ proposal. 
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There is no evidence that public policies are generating the essentializing tendencies in the public 
ethos. On the contrary, as I noted earlier, insofar as we have comparative data, it seems that the 
problem of ethnic stereotyping is lower in countries with multiculturalism policies (Weldon 2006). So 
it would be another case of `mistaken identity’ to blame multicultural public policies for an 
essentializing public ethos. 
Indeed, it may be that strengthening these policies is the best remedy. It may be that the best way 
for public authorities to combat an essentializing public ethos is to actively diffuse the more complex 
and sophisticated understandings about multiculturalism that are currently given to the public officials 
tasked to implement these policies. This indeed is more or less what Phillips proposes, such as new 
programs of community outreach and education. While she describes her book as a call for a `radical 
overhaul’ of multiculturalism, these suggestions seem to me to be firmly within the family of liberal 
multiculturalism, as is it already exists in countries like Canada, Australia and indeed the UK. Her 
recommendations seem largely to be a call for strengthening these policies. In short, the answer to the 
essentializing risks of a `strongly multiculturalist public ethos’ is not to abandon multiculturalist 
public policies, but to re-commit to them. 
(c) Critiques of Multiculturalist Activists 
Finally, let me turn to a third version of the post-multiculturalist critique, which is also in a sense 
about a `public ethos’ of multiculturalism, but which locates the problem in a different place. A good 
example is Jane Cowan’s work on the essentializing effects of the political mobilization for minority 
rights amongst the Macedonian minority in Greece. She shows how, in order to justify their claims for 
Macedonian language rights, ethnic activists are encouraging people of Macedonian origin to self-
identify in public as “Macedonian”, and not to identify themselves as “Greek”. This has been an uphill 
battle, in part because for many decades anyone who self-identified in this way was discriminated 
against by Greek public officials. But it is also an uphill battle because many ethnic Macedonians 
have, over the years, come to identify with the Greek language, literature and culture, and indeed to 
take pride in it. Whereas ethnic activists promote a discourse in which “they” (the Greeks) have a long 
history of persecuting “us” (the Macedonians), most ethnic Macedonians themselves do not share this 
simple us vs them identity. In some contexts, they too feel Greek, and not just in the sense of being a 
citizen of the state of Greece, but also in the sense of participating in a Greek-language culture, even 
as they still retain a sense of Macedonian identity, and an attachment to their ancestral language. 
Whereas activists seek to impose a particular narrative or script in which one must choose between 
being Greek or Macedonian - a proud Macedonian is someone who resents and rejects what `they’ the 
Greeks have done to `us’ and our language – most ethnic Macedonians resent having to make this sort 
of choice amongst their multiple identities. 
Cowan finds this minority activist discourse to be disturbing. Recall her central claim: she is 
concerned with the ethical ambiguities of a discourse which may constrain, as much as enable, 
many of those it is meant to empower, by forcing their expressions of difference into a 
dichotomous interpretive frame that misrepresents their complex identities … This is the central 
ambiguity of a minority rights discourse; that it must deny ambiguity and fix difference in the 
realms of identity, or cultural practice, in defense of distinct cultures…even when meant to contest 
claims of national homogeneity, it locks us ever more tightly into precisely the same national logic 
of purity, authenticity and fixity (Cowan 2001: 154, 171). 
This is a compelling case study, and it is not unique to that particular country or minority. It echoes 
fears expressed by Fraser and Appiah about minority activist discourses in the United States. Fraser 
worries that minority scripts “put moral pressure on individual members to conform to group culture. 
The result is often to impose a single, drastically simplified group identity, which denies the 
complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifications and the cross-pulls of their 
various affiliations (Fraser 2001: 24). Similarly, Appiah has famously argued that minority scripts 
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exaggerate group homogeneity, and seek to enforce this homogeneity “by regulative mechanisms 
designed to marginalize and silence dissent from its basic norms and mores” (Appiah 2004: 151-2). 
This is a very important issue, but it is different from that in Phillips’ work. Phillips’ concern (as 
I’ve interpreted it) is primarily with how a `multiculturalist public ethos’ can lead members of the 
dominant group to have essentialist views about minorities - that is, multiculturalism encourages 
members of the mainstream to treat members of minority groups as prisoners of their exotic cultures, 
thereby reinforcing their already-existing prejudices. Cowan, by contrast, is primarily concerned with 
how members of the minority group itself, particularly its self-appointed activist leaders, seek to 
impose a particular script on co-members. Her focus is on intra-group processes of essentialization, 
not inter-group essentialization.
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Processes of intra-group essentialization clearly exist. But what does this have to do with liberal 
multiculturalism? After all, we can find examples of self-appointed leaders of ethnic and religious 
groups trying to impose “purity, authenticity and fixity” on their members throughout history and 
around the world, long before the rise of multiculturalism. This is as old as the Bible – indeed, we 
might say it is an eternal feature of ethnic and religious life. There are always some people within any 
group who are telling other members that they need to return to a more original, authentic or pure form 
of their culture or creed (just as there are always revisers and reformers who are pushing for more 
open and pluralistic understandings of identity and culture). This is the stuff of great novels and 
literature around the world for centuries. It would be bizarre to imply that this phenomenon only 
emerged when liberal multiculturalism arose in the 1960s. 
Indeed, it’s particularly bizarre to blame multiculturalism for the essentializing discourses of 
minority activists in Greece, since Greece has no multiculturalism policy! It is one of the countries in 
Europe (along with France and Turkey) that has most resolutely opposed any ideology of 
multiculturalism. Indeed, we might say that this is precisely the problem: Greece has no legal 
principles or political culture of liberal multiculturalism, and hence has no established traditions within 
either the minority or majority for accepting ideas of multiple and complementary loyalties and 
identities. The Greek government has operated on the premise that ethnic identities are zero-sum and 
inherently antagonistic, and the minority activists simply replicate this assumption. The solution to 
this, one might argue, is precisely a good dose of liberal multiculturalism, both in terms of legislation 
and political culture. Indeed, this is one of the findings of cross-national research on multiculturalism I 
cited earlier. By ensuring respect and recognition for a minority’s identity, multiculturalism policies 
facilitate minority members adopting dual and complementary identities that bridge to the larger 
society, thereby enabling better psychological well-being and educational outcomes (Berry et al 2006). 
Multiculturalism policies can help turn what were seen as zero-sum identities into multiple and 
complementary identities.  
Cowan (sometimes) acknowledges that this tendency towards essentialization predates 
multiculturalism, but she nonetheless worries that multiculturalism might exacerbate it. 
Multiculturalism might, for example, empower activists to force this essentializing script on unwilling 
group members. This recalls Appiah’s concern that the “civil apparatus” of group recognition can be 
used to “marginalize and silence dissent” within a group, or Fraser’s concern that multiculturalism can 
be used to “impose a single drastically simplified group identity”.  
But does multiculturalism really allow activists to “force” or “impose” identities, or to “silence: 
dissent? How are we to interpret these dramatic claims of “forcing”, “imposing”, “suppressing”, 
“policing”, and “silencing”? If it is meant literally – ie., that multiculturalism policies would legally 
empower minority activists to “force” members to accept a simplified identity – then it is simply false. 
In the Macedonian case, minority activists have no legal power whatsoever to compel group members 
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to identify as exclusively Macedonian, and nor would they somehow gain this power if Greece 
suddenly adopted stronger minority language rights. On the contrary, the right of individuals not to be 
forced to declare a minority identity is a fundamental principle of both European and international 
human rights law, which is precisely the law that minority activists are appealing to. It is no part of 
their agenda – and no part of any possible multiculturalist outcome – that they would gain the power to 
legally compel people of Macedonian origin to adopt or declare a Macedonian identity. 
Of course, one could imagine scenarios in which minority activists would use non-legal coercion or 
intimidation to force individuals to accept their script. Activists might threaten to assault people, or to 
burn down their houses, if they do not declare an exclusive Macedonian identity. This surely happens 
in many cases around the world. But this is not what Cowan has in mind. She gives no evidence that 
activists use extra-legal coercion against group members. As she tells the story, activists operate fully 
within the law. Similarly Appiah and Fraser are not recounting acts of physical threat or intimidation 
by minority activists. 
So in what sense then do minority activists “impose” or “force” their script on unwilling members? 
To my mind, this is the crucial question for any liberal-democratic theory, yet it is sidestepped by all 
of these authors. After all, it is a foundational right within any democratic society that people can 
freely state their opinion that (for example) a proud Macedonian should speak Macedonian wherever 
possible, and should resist the corrupting influences of Greek culture. In a democratic society, people 
must be free to state this sort of opinion, and to seek to persuade others of it.  
In principle, one could imagine attempting to forbid anyone expressing this sort of opinion, but this 
could only be done by violating fundamental civil liberties. Surely no one thinks that Jewish activists 
should be prohibited from saying that a good Jew will marry within the faith and avoid the corrupting 
influences of Christian culture (eg., celebrating Christmas), even if this reproduces (in Cowan’s 
words) a dichotomous “logic of purity, authenticity and fixity”.  
So far as I know, no post-multiculturalist would endorse the radical solution of banning speech that 
involves this sort of essentialist logic. But what then exactly is the problem, and how do we fix it? 
What is the nature of this “forcing” and “imposing” an identity on someone, and how do we 
distinguish it from, say, “democratically persuading” someone to adopt an identity? Fraser says that 
multiculturalism enables group leaders to exercise “moral pressure” on group members, and that this is 
how identities are “imposed”. But what distinguishes moral pressure from moral persuasion? What 
criteria do we use to distinguish legitimate forms of argumentation and mobilization from illegitimate 
“moral pressure”, “force” and “imposition”, and how can we address these latter problems without 
restricting basic civil and political liberties? 
So far as I can tell, the post-multiculturalists have no answer to this question, and as a result, they 
offer no guidelines for how to revise the practice of multiculturalism.
10
 If the problem is “moral 
pressure” within a group, rather than legal compulsion or extra-legal intimidation, what can and should 
a liberal democracy do, other than firmly insisting on the right of other citizens inside and outside the 
group to freely and democratically contest that particular script? Post-multiculturalists often conclude 
by emphasizing the necessity of enabling democratic contestation of scripts, but of course that simply 
restates a core part of liberal multiculturalism.  
The right to democratic contestation is crucial, but it’s worth noting that there was nothing in the 
Macedonian case that precluded such democratic contestation by those with alternate understandings 
of Macedonian and Greek identity. Indeed, this is clear from Cowan’s own story: the reality is that the 
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Macedonian activists have largely been unsuccessful in persuading people to adopt an exclusive 
Macedonian identity, precisely because they are not in a position to “force” or “impose” this identity 
on anyone. Minority activists are trying to peacefully and democratically persuade their co-ethnics to 
adopt a certain script about who they are as a group, but theirs is just one voice and one narrative in an 
ongoing democratic process of deliberation and contestation and persuasion. It’s not clear what, if 
anything, Cowan would propose to change in this scenario. 
So it’s unclear what implications this version of the post-multiculturalist critique has for the real-
world practice of multiculturalism. And so, unsurprisingly, Cowan too ends up hedging on what, if 
any, changes follow from her analysis. She concludes by saying that “the only tenable position for the 
engaged scholar [is] a paradoxical one: to support the demands for recognition of the Macedonian 
minority, but as a category that is chosen rather than imposed (whether explicitly or de facto), yet at 
the same time, to problematize rather than celebrate its project, and to query its emancipatory aura, 
examining the exclusions and cultural disenfranchisement it creates from within’ (Cowan 2001: 171). 
She presents this as a critique of liberal multiculturalism, but, so far as I can tell, it is simply a 
restatement of liberal multiculturalism, both as it is theorized and as it is embodied in public policies 
and international law. Liberal multiculturalism, like Cowan, supports demands for recognition within 
liberal-democratic constraints that do not allow for the involuntary ascription of ethnic categories or 
for the undemocratic imposition of cultural scripts. So far as I can tell, like all of these post-
multiculturalist authors, she offers no tangible recommendations for reform that differ from, or go 
beyond, a liberal multiculturalist framework.
11
 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have explored what appears to be a nearly-unanimous consensus amongst recent 
writers that multiculturalism is guilty of essentialism, and that addressing this problem requires a 
radical overhaul of the multiculturalist project. I have suggested that, despite this seeming consensus, 
the implications of this critique are in fact indeterminate, in large part because critics fail to make clear 
their target, and hence the required remedy. While the different versions of this critique all point to 
legitimate issues – essentializing tendencies clearly exist in society - it’s not clear in what ways liberal 
multiculturalism is contributing to these tendencies, and hence in what ways multiculturalism might 
need to be reformed. While all of the authors begin with a strong rhetorical commitment to a radical 
overhaul of multiculturalism, by the end of their analysis, they have all backed away from making any 
radical proposals for change. Indeed, so far as I can tell, they do not cite a single example of a group-
differentiated right that liberal multiculturalists endorse that they would reject on essentialist (or other) 
grounds. 
Ironically, I believe that this post-multiculturalist critique of essentialism is itself guilty of 
reification. According to critics, multiculturalism reifies ethnic groups as unified agents who speak 
and act with one unified voice. I would argue that this critique itself involves a reification of 
multiculturalism, treating it as if it is a single unified force that walks and talks out there in the world. 
According to critics, multiculturalism is actively “encouraging” people to think in essentialist terms, 
“pressuring” people to act in essentialist ways, even “forcing” and “imposing” essentialist identities 
and practices on people. But all of this talk of multiculturalism doing things out there in the world is 
hopelessly reified. Multiculturalism isn’t a single actor or force that speaks with a single voice. It 
operates at different levels: theorists of multiculturalism say one set of things; laws, bureaucratic 
regulations and court decisions tell us another set of things; the media tell us yet another; and activists 
have their own message. We can’t hope to figure out how to improve multiculturalism – or how to 
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build a better post-multiculturalism, if you prefer – without pinning down which actors at which levels 
are responsible for which effects. 
At the end of her book, Anne Phillips pleads for a new version of multiculturalism that puts agency 
at the centre of the project. I agree with this commitment to agency – as I noted earlier, autonomy is 
the foundational premise of my approach – but I would say that we need to put agency at the centre of 
any useful critique of multiculturalism. The post-multiculturalist literature is full of agentless 
processes. According to post-multiculturalists, there is this thing called multiculturalism that is telling 
people, encouraging people, pressuring people, forcing people – but it is never specified who is doing 
this talking, encouraging, pressuring or forcing. Is it theorists, legislators, bureaucrats, judges, social 
workers, educators, activists, media commentators? I believe that if we start to specify the actors, and 
hence the causal processes, it might turn out that liberal multiculturalism is not after all in need of a 
radical overhaul.  
This is not to say that the early theorists of liberal multiculturalism somehow resolved all the key 
theoretical issues twenty years ago, and that the only task is to build the political will to more fully 
implement those theories. For one thing, the early theorists of multiculturalism had important 
disagreements amongst themselves, which remain unresolved.
12
 Moreover, the world has changed in 
the past two decades, and new challenges have emerged that were barely even contemplated in the 
first wave of multiculturalist theories. Let me mention just a few of these issues: 
1. Existing theories of liberal multiculturalism implicitly or explicitly operate on the assumption 
that immigrants are settled permanently in their country of residence, as opposed to being 
temporary visitors or migrant workers, and are intended to provide new models of inclusion for 
such permanent residents. Multiculturalism as a model of inclusion only become relevant and 
meaningful in Europe when it was accepted that post-war immigrants were “here to stay”. For a 
period in the 1980s and 1990s, this was indeed the reigning assumption. But today we see a 
resurgence of programs of temporary or seasonal migration, both at the low end of the socio-
economic ladder (eg., seasonal farm workers) and at the high end (skilled workers on short-
term contracts). We also see sizeable numbers of unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers, 
both of whom face the prospect of being forced to return to their country of origin. This 
proliferation of migrant statuses, with varying and unpredictable durations of stay, has led to a 
situation that Vertovec calls “super diversity” (Vertovec 2005). It is far from clear, in either 
theory or practice, what sort of multiculturalism is appropriate in contexts other than permanent 
settlement. 
2. Existing theories of liberal multiculturalism presuppose, implicitly or explicitly, that state-
minority relations are “desecuritized” – that is, the governance of state-minority relations is 
seen as an issue of social policy to be addressed through the normal democratic process of 
claims-making, consultation, and debate, not as an issue of state security that trumps normal 
democratic processes. States are highly unlikely to accord multicultural rights to minorities 
who are seen as disloyal, or as potential collaborators with enemies. I have elsewhere argued 
that the vast bulk of state-minority relations in the West were indeed desecuritized in the post-
war period, particularly in the crucial period of the `ethnic revival’ in the 1960s to 1980s. This 
was true in relation to indigenous peoples, substate national minorities and most immigrants, 
and this made possible experiments in liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007). But today, 
particularly since 9/11, we see a resurgence of the security framework, most obviously in 
relation to Muslims. This has led to diminished support for multiculturalism, but also to subtle 
(or not so subtle) revisions to multiculturalism programs so that they focus on fighting 
radicalism rather than on issues of accommodation and inclusion. Multiculturalism, when it 
persists at all, is being used as a tool for monitoring and policing the behaviour of Muslims 
suspected of disloyalty. We can bemoan this distortion of multiculturalism, but we cannot 
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pretend as if issues of security do not exist. And this raises difficult questions, unresolved in 
theory or practice, about what we might call securitized multiculturalism, as distinct from the 
desecuritized multiculturalism theorized in the early 1990s. 
In these two respects, some of the preconditions of liberal multiculturalism are eroding. Liberal 
multiculturalism, I would argue, was theorized for situations in which immigrants were seen as legally 
authorized, permanently settled, and presumptively loyal. In an age of securitization and super-
diversity, these assumptions are put into question. 
But even where these assumptions are still valid, there are important issues that were not 
adequately addressed in early theories of multiculturalism. Let me mention two of them: 
3. Critics often claim that multiculturalism is about segregation and “parallel societies”, and say 
that multiculturalism should therefore be replaced with a “civic integration” approach, built 
around things like language requirements and citizenship tests (Joppke 2004, 2007). Theorists 
of multiculturalism have always insisted that multiculturalism for immigrant groups is not 
about segregation, but rather is a mode of integration, aiming at fairer terms of inclusion. And 
so, at a conceptual level, there is no inherent inconsistency between multiculturalism policies 
and civic integration policies, and indeed countries like Canada and Australia have always had 
robust integration policies alongside their robust multiculturalism policies. But we do not yet 
have good theories about the relationship between civic integration policies and 
multiculturalism policies, and about when the former complement or subvert the latter.
13
 And 
this in turn raises even deeper questions about the relationship between multiculturalism and 
nationalism. While critics often assume that multiculturalism aims to dislodge the centrality of 
national identities, and that is therefore pushes us towards a post-national world, it may well be 
the case that multiculturalism works best when it is seen as a constituent part of national 
identities, and when it pushes us towards a more “multicultural nationalism”. This indeed has 
been the argument recently made by Varun Uberoi (2008). Yet the conceptual links between 
multiculturalism and nationhood remain under-theorized. 
4. Finally, in retrospect, it seems clear that early theories of multiculturalism did not adequately 
address the specific challenges that religion raises. This is certainly true of the “Canadian 
school” of multiculturalism, reflected in the work of people like Taylor, Tully, Carens and my 
own work, which was heavily shaped by the claims of the Quebecois and Aboriginal peoples, 
neither of whom mobilize around faith-based claims. Even immigrant groups in Canada have 
not historically mobilized around religion, at least not until very recently. Multiculturalism in 
the Canadian context has therefore been theorized in terms of language, territory, race, ethnicity 
and indigeneity, rather than religion. This inattention to religion has been rightly criticized by 
many scholars (eg., Modood 2007). By contrast, public debates in Europe today around 
multiculturalism are almost exclusively focused on religion, and particularly on Muslims. This 
raises a whole host of complex issues, not least about the meaning of secularism and about 
when multicultural claims framed in the language of faith are or are not consistent with 
secularism. These issues are rendered even more intractable in many countries by the fact that 
states have rarely been consistent over time in the way they have interpreted secularism, with 
the result that there is typically a palimpsest of different accommodations reached at different 
times with different religious groups. In evaluating faith-based claims, should our goal be to 
implement what we now as a society take to be the most persuasive interpretation of the 
requirements of secularism, even if this means that newer religious groups are denied long-
standing accommodations that were offered to earlier religious groups? Or should we rather 
aim to ensure that there is no discrimination between religious groups, and hence ensure that 
any accommodations negotiated in the past for one group be offered today to newer groups? In 
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my view, this is not a rhetorical question: it is a genuine moral dilemma, for which again we 
lack good theoretical tools (Kymlicka 2009). 
This is just a sample of the unresolved issues confronting theorists of multiculturalism. One could 
quickly expand the list, particularly if we move beyond the immigrant case to also consider unresolved 
issues around the claims of substate national minorities and indigenous peoples. So there is no 
shortage of theoretical work remaining to be done, on the proliferating forms of diversity, the 
securitization of diversity, the link with civic integration and national identities, and with religion and 
secularism. On all of these issues and others, early theories of multiculturalism now seem at best 
incomplete, and at worst outdated, resting on assumptions and preconditions that may no longer apply.  
Yet I would argue that on all of these issues, neither the `post-multiculturalism’ nor the `anti-
multiculturalism’ literature is of much help. Both have misidentified the nature and goals of 
multiculturalism, and hence misdiagnosed the challenges we face, and prematurely closed off 
theoretical and practical options that deserve our attention. In facing up to the challenges of the 21
st
 
century, I would still argue that multiculturalism remains a viable starting point. 
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